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 Introduction 
Estimating the downtime infrastructures is a subject on which scientists and policy makers 
have recently put much attention. The downtime can be defined as the time required to achieve 
a recovery state after a disastrous event; therefore, it is strictly linked with the indirect losses of 
the damaged infrastructure. Furthermore, the downtime is also an essential parameter to esti-
mate resilience. In engineering, resilience  is defined as “the ability of social units (e.g. organ-
izations, communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they occur, and 
carry out recovery activities in ways to minimize social disruption and mitigate the effects of 
further earthquakes" [1-3]. Under this context, downtime is the time span between the moment 
that the earthquake hits (t0 = 0), when the functionality Qi(t) drops to Qi(0), until the time when 
the functionality of the utility is completely restored [3] (Figure 1). Some of the factors that can 
affect the downtime are: the structural inspection, the assessment of damage, the finance plan-
ning, the bidding  process, the repair effort, and the engineering consolation [4]. 
One of the first attempts to evaluate the disruption time following an event was done by 
Basöz and Mander (1999) [5]. In their work, they developed downtime fragility curves for the 
transportation lifeline. The fragility curves were later integrated in the highway transportation 
lifeline module of HAZUS. Another downtime estimation methodology was developed based 
on a modified repair-time model [6]. This methodology estimates the downtime of only the 
rational structural components of a system due to the uncertainty involved in the process. In 
addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has introduced the electronic 
Abstract:  
Estimating the downtime of infrastructures following a disastrous event is one of 
the most important, yet uncertain aspects in the resilience evaluation process. This 
paper proposes an empirical probabilistic model for estimating the downtime of life-
lines following earthquakes. First, a large database has been collected from a wide 
range of literature. This database contains data on downtimes of infrastructures 
collected for a number of earthquakes that took place in the past century. Fragility 
restoration functions have been derived using the gamma distribution, which was 
selected because of its fit with the distribution of the collected data. For each of the 
lifelines, different fragility functions have been obtained for different earthquake 
magnitudes. The functions were represented in terms of probability of recovery and 
time. The longer is the time after the disaster, the higher is the probability of the 
infrastructure to recover its functions.  
 
tool PACT, which estimates the required repair time of buildings based on the damaged 
structural and non-structural components as well as on the building’s contents. PACT is 
considered the companion to FEMA P-58, a significant 10-year project funded by FEMA to 
develop a framework for performance-based seismic design and risk assessment of buildings 
[7]. Moreover, Almufti and Willford (2013) have suggested a modified downtime methodology 
based on the results coming from PACT. All details can be found in the REDi rating system 
report [8]. Also, a performance-based earthquake engineering method to estimate the downtime 
of infrastructures using fault trees has been introduced [9]. This method is applicable only when 
the downtime is mostly controlled by the non-structural systems damage. It also assumes that 
the restoration starts immediately after the event and the damaged components are repaired in 
parallel.  Generally, several factors are involved in the downtime estimation, such as the 
characteristics of the exposed structure, the earthquake intensity, and the amount of human 
force that is assigned to recover the damaged infrastructure. With all of these factors, the 
process of estimating the downtime becomes even harder. Therefore, it is crucial to have a 
simple model for estimating the downtime of infrastructures. The aim of this study is to develop 
a probabilistic model to evaluate the downtime of lifelines following a seismic event.  
Four different types of lifelines are studied in this work (power, water, gas, and telecom-
munication). First, a large database has been collected from a wide range of literature. The 
database contains real data on a number of seismic events that occurred in the last century as 
well as on the downtimes of the affected infrastructures. Fragility restoration functions have 
been obtained using the gamma distribution, which has been selected because of its fit with the 
distribution of the collected data. For each of the lifelines, a group of fragility curves has been 
derived in accordance with the earthquake magnitude, and they have been presented in terms 
of probability of recovery and time; the longer is the time after the disaster, the higher is the 
probability of the infrastructure to recover its functionality. 
 
 
Figure 1: Resilience concept 
 
 DOWNTIME DATABASE OF LIFELINES 
Table 1 lists all the earthquakes considered in this work along with the year in which they 
occurred, the country they hit, and their intensity according to Richter scale of magnitude. A 
number of other damaging earthquakes that occurred during the same period have been col-
lected, but not included in this study because no engineering damage reports could be obtained 
for those events. Nevertheless, the events included in this study are sufficient to provide some 
useful illustrations for the recovery behaviour of the examined lifelines. 
Table 1: Summary of the analyzed earthquakes 
Earthquake Year Country Magnitude Reference 
Loma Prieta 1989 USA 6.9 [10] 
Northridge  1994 USA 6.7 [11] 
Kobe  1995 Japan 6.9 [12]  
Niigata  2004 Japan 6.6 [13] 
Maule  2010 Chile 8.8 [14] 
Darfield  2010 New Zealand 7.1 [15]  
Christchurch  2011 New Zealand 6.3 [16] 
Napa  2014 USA 6 [17] 
Michoacán  1985 Mexico 8.1 [18]  
Off-Miyagi  1978 Japan 7.4 [19] 
San Fernando  1971 USA 6.6 [20]  
The Oregon Resilience Plan   2013 USA 9 [21] 
LA Shakeout Scenario 2011 USA 7.8 [22] 
Tohoku  2011 Japan 9 [23] 
Niigata  1964 Japan 7.6 [24] 
Illapel  2015 Chile 8.4 [25] 
Nisqually  2001 USA 6.8 [26] 
Kushiro-oki  1993 Japan 7.8 [27] 
Hokkaido Toho-oki  1994 Japan 8.2 [27] 
Sanriku  1994 Japan 7.5 [27] 
Alaska  1964 USA 9.2 [28] 
Luzon  1990 Philippines 7.8 [29] 
El Asnam  1980 Algeria 7.1 [30] 
Tokachi-oki  1968 Japan 8.3 [31] 
Kanto  1923 Japan 7.8 [32] 
Valdivia  1960 Chile 9.5 [33] 
Nihonkai-chubu  1983 Japan 7.8 [34] 
Bam  2003 Iran 6.6 [35] 
Samara  2012 Costa Rica 7.6 [36] 
Arequipa  2001 Peru 8.4 [33] 
Izmir  1999 Turkey 7.4 [37] 
Chi-Chi  1999 Taiwan 7.6 [38] 
Alaska 2002 USA 7.9 [39] 
 
Table 2 lists the complete database used to create the restoration curves of each lifeline. 
The different earthquakes are listed in a random order. It is notable that each earthquake has 
caused damage to multiple infrastructures at the same time. For instance, in the city of Loma 
Prieta, the earthquake caused damage to two power plants, ten water systems, five gas stations, 
and six telecommunication systems. However, the affected infrastructures needed different 
times to recover even when the infrastructures are of similar types. For example, the two power 
plants that were affected by the Loma Prieta earthquake needed 2 and 0.5 days respectively to 
recover. In addition, there were some cases where either the damage information was not avail-
able or no damage was recorded. Such cases are marked with a dash (-) inside the table. 
Table 2: The number of affected infrastructures and the corresponding downtime for each lifeline 
Earthquakes 
Lifelines affected 
     Power      Water      Gas     Telecom. 
No. DT (days) 
No
. DT (days) No. DT (days) No. 
DT 
(days) 
Loma Prieta 2 (2), (0.5) 10 
(14), (4), (3), 
(1.5), (2), (1), 
(3), (3), (7),  (4) 
5 
(30), (16), 
(11), (10), 
(10) 
6 
(3), (4), 
(0.1), (3), 
(3), (1.5) 
Northridge  3 (3), (0.5), (2) 6 
(7), (2), (58), 
(12), (67), (46) 
4 
(7), (30), (5), 
(4) 
3 (1), (2), (4) 
Kobe  5 
(8), (3), (2), (5), 
(6) 
3 (0.5), (8), (73) 3 
(84), (11), 
(25) 
3 (1), (5), (7) 
Niigata  4 (11), (4), (1) 3 (14), (28), (35) 3 
(28), (35), 
(40) 
- - 
Maule  6 
(14), (1), (3) 
(10), (14) 
4 
(42), (4), (16), 
(6), 
2 (10), (90) 4 
(17), (7), 
(3), (17) 
Darfield  3 (1), (2), (12) 2 (7), (1) 1 (1) 3 (9), (2), (3) 
Christchurch  3 (14), (0.16) 1 (30) 2 (14), (9) 2 (15), (9) 
Napa  1 (2) 6 
(20), (0.9), 
(0.75), (2,5), 
(12),  (11) 
1 (1) - - 
Michoacán  4 (4), (1), (3), (7) 4 
(30), (14), (40), 
(45) 
- - 1 (160) 
Off-Miyagi  2 (2), (1) 1 (12) 3 (27), (3), (18) 1 (8) 
San Fernando  1 (1) - - 2 (10), (9) 1 (90) 
The Oregon Resil. Plan   1 (135) 1 (14) 1 (30) 1 (30) 
LA Shakeout Scenario 1 (3) 1 (13) 1 (60) - - 
Tohoku Japan  7 
(45, (3), (8), (2), 
(2), (40) 
8 
(47), (47), (1), 
(26), (7), (1), 
(47), (47) 
6 
(54), (2), (30), 
(35), (13), 
(18) 
3 
(49), (21), 
(49) 
Niigata  2 (24) 3 (15), (4), (10) 2 (180), (2) - - 
Illapel  1 (3) 1 (3) - - - - 
Nisqually  3 (2), (6), (3) -  - - - - 
Kushiro-oki  1 (1) 3 (6), (3), (5) 2 (22), (3) - - 
Hokkaido Toho-oki  1 (1) 3 (9), (3), (5) - - - - 
Sanriku  1 (1) 3 (14), (12), (5) - - - - 
Alaska  3 (2), (0.75), (1) 5 
(14), (5), (1), 
(7), (14) 
3 
(1), (5), (2), 
(14) 
2 (1), (21) 
Luzon  3 (7), (2), (3) 3 (14), (14), (10) - - 3 
(5), (1), 
(0.4) 
El Asnam  - - 1 (14) - - - - 
Tokachi-oki  1 (2) -  2 (30), (20) - - 
Kanto  2 (7), (5) 1 (42) 2 (180), (60) 1 (13) 
Valdivia  1 (5) 1 (5) - - - - 
Nihonkai-chubu  1 (1) 1 (30) 1 (30) - - 
Bam  1 (4) 3 (14), (10) - - 1 (1) 
Samara  1 (1) 1 (2) - - 1 (1) 
Arequipa  1 (1) 3 (32), (34) - - - - 
Izmit  1 (1) 2 (5), (29) 1 (1) 1 (10) 
Chi-Chi  3 (4), (14), (19) 1 (9) 1 (14) 1 (10) 
Alaska 2002 2 (2), (0.5) 10 
(14), (4), (3), 
(1.5), (2), (1), 
(3), (3), (7), (4) 
1 
(3) 
 
6 
(3), (4), 
(0.1), (3), 
(3), (1.5) 
Note: No = the number of affected infrastructures; DT = the downtime in days. 
 METHODOLOGY 
The main challenge faced in this work is to illustrate the gathered data in the form of res-
toration curves. Typically, the procedure followed for constructing restoration curves is similar 
to that of fragility curves. The restoration process is one of the most uncertain variables in the 
resilience analysis; therefore, it is necessary to approach it in probabilistic terms. This is done 
by performing a statistical analysis to the raw data, trying to fit it to a statistical distribution. 
Nevertheless, choosing the right distribution can be a hard task due to the high number of dis-
tributions that exist in the literature.  
After some investigations, the gamma distribution was found to be the optimal fit to most 
of the database; hence, it is used to build the restoration curves. The probability distribution 
(PDF) of the gamma distribution is given by:   
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where Г(.) denotes the gamma distribution, α is the shape parameter, which allows the 
gamma distribution to take variety of shapes, β is the scale parameter whose effect is to stretch 
(greater than one) or squeeze the distribution (less than one). It is important to note that the 
exponential distribution is a special case of the gamma distribution function when the shape 
parameter α is set equal to 1. To obtain the values of α and β, it is first necessary to compute 
the mean and the standard deviation µD and σD. The mean value µD denotes the average value 
of a database consisting of n entries, and it is defined by:  
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On the other hand, the standard deviation σD is the dispersion of a random variable of the 
database with respect to the mean value. The value of the standard deviation is obtained with 
the following formula: 
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After obtaining both µD and σD, the parameters α and β can be estimated using Equations 
(4) and (5). 
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Afterwards, the restoration curves for each lifeline have been created using the software 
MATLAB® (Guide 1998). The restoration curves developed for different damage states within 
the same sample should not intersect in order to describe meaningful results. Intersection of 
restoration curves may occur when each curve corresponding to a specific damage state is fitted 
independently of one another [40]. So in order to avoid the intersection of the restoration curves 
corresponding to different damage states, the same standard deviation has been assumed, as 
suggested in the method described in [41], where the parameters of the distribution functions 
representing different states of damage are simultaneously estimated by means of the maximum 
likelihood method. In that method, the parameters to be estimated are the median of each fra-
gility curve and one value of the standard derivation that is assumed the same for all fragility 
curves.   
 RESTORATION CURVES 
Restoration curves were developed for the power, water, gas, and telecommunications sys-
tems based on the quantitative data obtained from the collected earthquakes. The curves are 
plotted based on the number of days required to restore full service to customers that lost service 
immediately after the earthquake (horizontal axis), and the likelihood that the utility will be 
completely restored to the customers (vertical axis). The restoration curves of the studied infra-
structures are presented in Figure 2. The collected data has been classified into four groups of 
Richter magnitude scale (strong 6-6.9, Major 7-7.9, Severe 8-8.9, and Violent 9-9.9), and this 
has led to obtaining four independent restoration curves for each lifeline. It is important to note 
that more groups with a smaller magnitude range could have been created; however, in this 
study, the database was not large enough, and therefore it was preferred to limit the number of 
groups to only four. 
The restoration curves of the lifelines are characterized by a similar behaviour. The only 
difference lies in the restoration rate. The power system seems to have the shorter downtime as 
the curves reach the probability of 100% just 60 days after the event, unlike the other infra-
structures, which needed at least 100 days to achieve a restoration probability of 100%. This 
result is expected because all lifelines need power to function, and thus the power system is 
always the first to recover. The telecommunication system, on the other hand, is heavily de-
pendent on the power network, which delays its restoration until the power system is recovered. 
This behaviour is shown in Figure 4, where the restoration probability of the telecommunication 
system did not reach 100% even after 100 days. Lastly, the gas and the water systems are almost 
identical where both of them reach a restoration probability of 100% after 100 days. 
 
Figure 2: Restoration curves of the four lifelines 
 
 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Downtime estimation is one of the most ambiguous aspects in the resilience engineering. 
Estimating the resilience of infrastructure due to earthquakes has been studied in the past; 
however, none of the studies highlighted a clear procedure to estimate the disruption time of 
damaged systems. This paper provides an empirical model for estimating the downtime of 
damaged infrastructures following earthquakes. This model is based on a large set of database 
for earthquake events that occurred over the last few decades. Different types of statistical 
distribution have been tested, and the gamma distribution has been chosen as it has the best fit 
to the collected data. Four main lifelines were considered in this work (power, water, gas, and 
telecommunication). For each of them, a group of four restoration curves have been derived. 
The restoration curves were presented in terms of the number of days required to restore full 
service to customers (horizontal axis), and the likelihood that the utility will be completely 
restored to the customers (vertical axis). 
Given that such models are still missing in literature, this work will provide a very useful 
tool to estimate the downtime of infrastructures when struck by earthquakes. It will also allow 
evaluating the infrastructures’ resilience as the downtime is a key parameters in the resilience 
estimation process. Future work will be oriented towards extending the database to include 
more earthquakes. In addition, special attention will be given to the infrastructure 
interdependency, which will increase the accuracy of the restoration curves. Other lifelines such 
as the transportation system will also be analyzed once satisfactory data of a considerable 
amount of earthquakes is collected. 
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